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what is UTM? 
• UTM = UAS traffic management 
– UAS = unmanned aircraft system 
• UTM can be considered as: 
– an air traffic management ecosystem for uncontrolled 
airspace 
– a separate, but complementary system to the air 
traffic management system 
• the objective of UTM is to inform the needs and 
requirements for enabling low-altitude UAS 
operations 
– services, roles & responsibilities, information 
architecture, data exchange protocols, software 
functions, infrastructure, performance requirements, 
etc. 
what is UTM? 
• important principles: 
– safe integration of UAS operations without 
burdening the current system 
– leverage private industry to supply new services 
under the FAA’s regulatory authority 
– scalable 
– structure where you need it, flexibility where you 
don’t 
 
what is UTM? 
• important rules: 
– UAS vehicles stay clear of each other 
– UAS vehicles stay clear of manned aircraft 
– differentiated access to users of higher priorities 
• important terms: 
– line-of-sight 
– beyond-visual line-of-sight (BVLOS) 
– part 101e operations (current-day hobbyists) 
– part 107 operations (current-day commerce) 
– part ??? operations 
what is UTM? 
• approach: 
– a progression over four distinct technical 
capabilities, associated with the possible risks of 
different operating environments 
• TCL = technical capability level 
– TCL1: 
• sparsely populated, rural areas 
• multiple line-of-sight operations 
• constraint checking, information 
sharing 
– TCL2 adds: 
• BVLOS operations 
• in-flight modifications 
• conformance monitoring 
 
– TCL3 adds: 
• manned/unmanned interactions 
• moderately populated areas 
• vehicle-to-vehicle 
communication 
– TCL4 adds: 
• urban environments 
• high-density operations 
• autonomous operations 
• large-scale contingency 
mitigations 
what is UTM? 
• system architecture 
what is UTM? 
• how does it work? (the simple explanation…) 
1. a UAS operator submits their operational plan (kind of like a 
flight plan), to their USS 
2. the USS checks the intended operation against known 
constraints 
• ‘static’ constraints (national park boundaries, class-airspace 
boundaries, airport locations, etc.) 
• ‘dynamic’ constraints (e.g., other operations) 
3. the USS notifies the UAS operator if they are in violation of 
any constraints 
4. the UAS operator makes any adjustments as they see fit (and 
may repeat steps 1-3) 
5. the UAS operator begins their flight 
6. the USS monitors the vehicle’s conformance with the 
submitted plan, and notifies the UAS operator if the 
maintained ‘state’ of that operation changes significantly 
• accepted, active, non-conforming, rogue, closed 
7. the UAS operator completes their flight 
human-factors research in UTM 
• our focus is on: 
– interface and procedure design 
– identifying minimum requirements and/or best 
practices that impact an operator’s experience 
• operator qualifications and training 
• operator information requirements 
• operator reporting requirements 
• response time [to notifications, ANSP directives, etc.] 
• so far, our data has come from: 
– subjective measurements 
• field observations, post-flight questionnaires, end-of-day 
debrief discussions 
– objective measurements 
• vehicle state data 
• UTM communications/messages logs 
human-factors research in UTM 
• data presented here comes from our most 
recent activity, the TCL2 national campaign 
• the TCL2nc was a distributed event that took 
place across six different test-sites 
– 26 shakedown flying days 
– 18 data-collection flying days 
– over 270 data-collection flights 
– 22 different vehicle types 
– 23 flight crews 
– 5 partner-built USSs 
operator qualifications and training 
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Reported experience level 
Hours spent on various UAS activities reported by 29 respondents 
• 80% of the respondents reported having an 
sUAS part 107 certificate 
– not all of these respondents were pilots 
operator qualifications and training 
topic comment 
training need for further training for the PIC and actual operation in the [USS] 
software and [GCS] software - in order to better understand UTM and 
eventually have the ability to execute the entire sequence of events for 
flying a mission. 
training 
 
for the moment we’re not used to using this tool but with few a flights 
it can become a very helpful tool to make decisions 
operator 
expertise 
the USS Operator has to also be very familiar with the performance 
characteristics of the airframe, similar to the PIC so that they are able 
to identify when the UAS may or may not become rogue. the USS 
Operator will [then] be able to better direct the PIC to maneuver 
accordingly before becoming non-conforming. 
• for some flight-crews, their training and 
familiarization of the UTM concept and 
procedures was low, which was detrimental to 
data collection 
operator information requirements 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
look at client look at GCS other data
sources
live vehicle
stream
look into
airspace
talk to VO talking to
other people
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
re
sp
o
n
se
s 
Sources of information 
Anticipated sources
Altitude stratification
information
• during shakedowns, 19 participants indicated they anticipated looking to 10 
sources for information, 25% being displays and 75% being other people or 
themselves.  
• during data-collection, 19 participants indicated they looked at eight sources for 
information during altitude-stratified operations, 60% being displays and 40% 
being other people or themselves.  
operator information requirements 
topic comment 
display would be useful to have a top-level display showing the position and track of 
other aircraft in real-time so that we can see their altitudes and flight plans in 
order to deconflict 
display the [interface] does not query and visualize any associated operation 
volumes, constraints, or other UTM aircraft in the event of alerts or negative 
UTM responses (e.g. rejected).  these kinds of visualizations will become 
increasingly important to provide as much situational awareness as possible 
to the user.  
information 
source 
all information needed was provided by my eyes, crew, & radio calls.  i had no 
information from [the USS] 
GUI the inclusion of symbology or other standard ways to quickly determine why 
a UAS entered a rogue state is very important when multiple UAS operations 
are being managed by one USS Operator  
under 
construction our aircraft display on [USS] was intermittent 
• many prototype displays didn’t yet have 
complete functionality and didn’t show as 
much information as needed to be useful 
operator information requirements 
topic comment 
team 
structure 
human-in-the-loop was a critical component of the conformance 
alerting capability.  communication protocols were established and 
exercised.  this combined with the audio alerts and geospatial 
displays provide an effective alerting mechanism for all levels of 
operators from the mission director to the pilot.  
team 
structure 
although there was significant work that needed to be done within 
the USS automation, the area of concern was the human-factors 
elements.  timely and effective information had to flow across the 
operations team, as [did] the operational burden on the mission 
director/flight director.  the USS Operator could not 
[simultaneously] support nominal and off nominal operations of 
multiple flights:  this was observed when a USS Operator was 
managing two UAS operations and both aircraft entered a rogue 
state at approximately the same time.  the messages and 
management of both operations were a bit challenging, as a lot of 
information was provided to the operator in a very short amount of 
time. 
• …were influenced by an individual’s training 
and a team’s organization/preparedness 
operator response time 
topic comment 
workload pilot workload issue:  outside of the test environment, during a real lost link / non-
conformance event, the pilot workload would be too great such that the pilot may 
never submit a message to UTM, or the message may be considerably delayed.  
the expectation that a pilot would message during an emergency procedure is not 
feasible. 
workload the centralized UTM approach adopted by [test-site A] placed a higher workload 
on the USS Operator.  this was definitely the case for our missions involving 
simultaneous operations by several (up to 5x) UAS. while this was definitely 
expected during the training/learning phase for our new [USS Operator], it was 
also somewhat still the case when our very knowledgeable [USS Operator] was at 
the helm.  while both individuals did show rapid adaption to the environment and 
tasks, they were still challenged at times with the workload associated with more 
than a few UAS. 
coordination a centralized implementation of the UTM architecture, where one [USS Operator] 
manages all airspace reservations and tracks every UAS takeoff/landing, requires 
close coordination between flight crews and the [USS Operator] both in the 
preflight phase and during flight operations.  however, for the accomplishment of 
multiple simultaneous UAS operations in close proximity, this approach seems 
quite reasonable. 
• …will depend heavily on team structure and 
organization 
 
summary of main findings 
participants were highly qualified… 
• had high levels of sUAS training and sUAS flying experience 
…but had a low understanding of the UTM concept 
• had less, direct exposure to UTM 
• flight-crews were neither involved in USS development or test-plan/scenario design 
• this affected their interactions with UTM, and ultimately, the collected data 
for situation awareness, participants… 
• obtained information from a variety of displays, including the USS displays (if 
available) 
• display usability influenced what information operators looked at or listened to 
over the course of the flight tests, participants… 
• increasingly understood the need to be aware of other vehicles 
operator response time… 
• was not specifically assessed (i.e., in units of seconds), during the TCL2nc 
• observers noted that the response time to a UTM notification depended heavily on a 
team’s structure, communication efficiency, and procedures 
the information requirements (and response times)… 
• were influenced by an individual’s training, a team’s organization/preparedness, and 
individual/team understanding of the UTM concept 
• future tests should continue to investigate these factors within the more complex 
environments of TCL3 and TCL4 
unexpected findings 
• the impact of less, direct exposure to UTM 
• the impact of safe, scripted flight tests on 
behavioral research 
– if you had to make a decision while your vehicle was close to another, 
please indicate how much the information from the USS helped you 
with your decision 
USS information was
critical to our DM
USS information was
helpful to our DM
USS information added
value to our DM
USS information was NOT
helpful to our DM
no decision making
n/a
closing remarks 
• conclusions 
– we’re getting better at extracting informative human-
factors data from our field activities 
– some UTM partners/participants are eager to iterate 
their operations with our findings 
– some UTM partners/participants don’t know much 
about UTM and (this is the issue) don’t particularly 
see the need to know about it 
• next steps 
– everyone wants information for situation awareness, 
but not everyone is always willing to share it 
– the team structure of having the USS Operator 
remotely located from the flight-crew may lead to SA 
issues for the flight-crew and workload issues for the 
USS Operator 
 
